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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes the effects of welfare reform on US poverty by applying a
two-stage estimation procedure with the random effects model using panel data from 1991
through 2003. Our results suggest that a rise in TANF or in unemployment rate raises
poverty, whereas the welfare reform started in 1996 has not contributed significantly to
poverty reduction.
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I. Introduction  
  We examine antipoverty effects of the welfare legislation of 1996. Poverty reduction is a 
commonly recognized social goal around the world.  In the US, the poverty rate has remained 
above 12 percent for more than a decade (US Census) with the lowest rate of 11.3 percent 
observed in 2000.  37 million, or about 1 out of 8, Americans live in poverty. With the ebb and 
flow of the poverty-related concerns at the U.S. policy circles, the last major act of legislation 
resulted in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 
1996, later known as the welfare reform. The stated goal of the reform was to establish a welfare 
system that would promote “responsibility, work ethic, self-sufficiency, and family values.”   
By imposing strict work requirements, PRWORA ended the six decades long Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) that had not required the aid recipients to work for 
pay. The new legislation replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
Not surprisingly, TANF caseloads have subsequently dropped by more than 50 percent, i.e. by 
7.3 million at the national level between August 1996 and June 2003. Low unemployment rates 
and increased labor force participation are believed to be two of the key macroeconomic factors 
responsible for this apparent improvement.  
A sound macro performance of the economy can push the wage rate up and draw more 
workers into the labor pool (Gundersen and Ziliak 2004, Kang et al. 2004). Yet, the entry of poor 
low-skill workers in the labor market does not guarantee an increase in their real income as 
higher wages might reduce welfare benefits and neutralize earned income increases (Blank 
2002).  Though PRWORA does not directly target poverty reduction since the new welfare is a 
program of temporary assistance, a policy that seeks to encourage work is expected to have 
relatively strong implications for poverty alleviation. 
We find, however, that despite significant reduction in the TANF caseloads the welfare 
reform implemented in 1996 has not reduced poverty significantly in the U.S. We apply a two-
stage estimation procedure with the fixed- and random-effects model using panel data from 1991 
through 2003. Our results do suggest that a decrease in TANF or in unemployment rate leads to a 
lower poverty level, but that the welfare reform started in 1996 has failed to contribute 
significantly to poverty reduction. 
 
II.   Prior Work 
Kilty (2006) strongly argues that there has been no connection between the smaller 
TANF and poverty, and that instead of reducing poverty TANF has only succeeded in making it 
invisible. Several studies have looked into the causes of a significant drop in the TANF caseloads 
by exploring the relationship among income, wellbeing and poverty from various perspectives.   
Focusing on low-income women and children, Schoeni and Blank (2000) and Grogger 
(2002) assert that TANF has significantly reduced the incidence of poverty among less skilled 
women.  On the other hand, Meyer and Sullivan (2001) analyze total consumption among low 
income women and assert modestly that welfare reform has not resulted in a decrease in 
women’s wellbeing.  Using longitudinal data to assess the impact on specific categories of 
households, Connolly and Marston (2004) find that welfare reform improves economic outcomes 
for high school graduates but not for the non-graduating families.   
In a comprehensive review, Blank (2002) cautions against equating the effects of welfare 
reform with poverty reduction, in the absence of appropriate measures of economic well-being.  
She also argues for the importance of exploring the long-term impact of the overall US economic 
performance on welfare recipients, as it is only in the context of economic cycles that we can   - 2 - 
distinguish between economic and welfare policy effects. 
Following Blank's suggestion, we recognize different types of effects of the welfare 
policy but choose just one aspect of the effects for our empirical investigation. Our question is, 
after controlling for other determinants of poverty, can we say whether the implementation of 
PRWORA has reduced poverty in the US?  We use panel data from 1991 to 2003 for 48 
contiguous states.  Specifically, we analyze the relationship between population living in poverty 
and TANF/AFDC recipients while controlling for unemployment, education, the onset of welfare 
reform, and selected geographic factors.  Estimation results suggest that the welfare reform has 
not significantly reduced poverty in the U.S.   
 
III. Data and Modeling Methods   
We construct our dataset from the following sources.  Poverty related data and the 
percentage of families living below 100 percent of the poverty line (POVR) are from the Current 
Population Survey of the Census Bureau. Unemployment rate (UNEMPR) comes from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The source of education-related data⎯public high school dropout 
rates (DROPOUT) ⎯ is the Department of Education. Welfare related data such as TANF 
recipients (TANFR), welfare administration costs (LADMIN), and total TANF benefits 
(LBENEFIT) come from the Health and Human Services Department. Overall, our sample 
consists of 464 observations representing a panel of 48 states and for any state a maximum of 13 
years of data from 1991 to 2003. 
To measure the effect of welfare reform, we use a reform dummy (REFORM) for the 
implementation of PRWORA in 1997.  The reform sought to encourage self-sufficiency through 
work. But by putting a cap on the duration of welfare benefits, it also increased the cost of 
dropping out of school. Thus one would expect the policy change to have had a ripple effect on 
the rate of unemployment and the level of education as well. To allow for these additional 
effects, we introduce interactive terms (UNEMPR97, DROPOUT97) between the reform regime 
on the one hand and unemployment and schooling on the other.  In addition, to capture any 
changes in the geographic disposition of poverty, we also include regional dummy variables 
WEST, SOUTH and MIDWEST, by taking the Northeast as the control region. Descriptive 
statistics of our variables appear in Table 1. 
The PRWORA made the states determine the eligibility and the size of benefits under 
TANF. While these objective criteria are different for different states, each state must identify a 
sufficiently low financial status for TANF eligibility.  The Federal poverty guideline ($20,650 of 
income for a family of 4 persons at the 100% poverty guideline in 2007, for instance) is used by 
states for some of their programs such as children’s health insurance, but the guideline is not 
directly used in cash assistance programs such as TANF (IRP, 2007).  
TANF recipients also face time limits on benefits and have work requirements.  For 
example, an increased labor supply could affect real income status of TANF recipients and result 
in a lower poverty rate.  Thus an element of endogeneity sets into the percentage of TANF 
recipients. But searching for suitable instruments that could resolve the problem of endogenous 
TANFR has proved most challenging.  We note that the benefits under TANF/AFDC are the paid 
cash benefits and expenses incurred to administer the program are resolved at the state and 
federal levels from past fiscal year’s records; and they are largely exogenously determined. 
Hence, we use these expenses with one-year lag of time as instruments for the TANFR variable. 
Data on benefits and administrative expenses show large skewness and heavy tails at 
their level form. For example, the benefit received has a mean value about three times as large as   - 3 - 
the median displaying a large positive skewness and many observations on the tails. A simple log 
transformation of these variables makes their distribution close to normal. Our first step 
regression results are based on data for these transformed variables: LBENEFIT and LADMIN. 
  The regression function appears in equation (1).  To let error term better represent normal 
distribution, we apply least squares method to logarithmic function for year t and state i: 
it i it it it it S it it it u REFORM x REFORM z x TANFR POVR ε β β β β β β + + + × × + + + + = 97 3 2 1 0 ' ' ' ' '   
            ( 1 )  
where x is the vector of explanatory variables of unemployment rate (UNEMPR) and high 
school dropouts (DROPOUT). Vector z measures regional distribution (WEST, MIDWEST, and 
SOUTH). REFORM is the dummy variable that separates the implementation of welfare policy, 
PRWORA, starting 1997, from the earlier period. As discussed before, PRWORA might have 
affected other socio-economic outcomes, particularly unemployment and schooling. Hence, we 
include terms involving interaction of welfare with UNEMPR and DROPOUT to capture such 
effects. βs are the coefficient vectors. We estimate both the fixed- and random-effects models but 
report the results for the latter because of its superiority on econometric grounds. The term ui is 
the group effect with variance σu
2, and zero cross-group effect, and the residual ε follows the 
classical distribution with mean 0 and variance σε
2.  
  To make statistical inferences about the relationship between TANF recipients and 
people in poverty and to test the impact of PRWORA, we put forward the following hypotheses 
against the null of no effect: 
  H1: TANF/AFDC recipients have a positive effect on poverty rate, i.e., βTANFR > 0. 
We expect to reject the null hypothesis since a decline in the rate of TANF/AFDC recipients 
implies a decrease in poverty.  
  H2: PRWORA has a significant impact on the poverty rate, i.e., βREFORM ≠ 0. 
The policy implication of H2, if verified, is that the implementation of welfare reform helps 
reduce poverty.  We do not hypothesize a specific sign for βREFORM a priori since the literature 
indicates ambiguous results. 
 
IV. Empirical results 
Four sets of parameters are estimated from model (1), with and without the interaction of 
the REFORM dummy variable. The first two models do not take into account the possible 
endogeneity of the TANFR variable, while the last two models, labeled (IV), instrument for the 
possible endogeneity in TANFR using a two-stage regression. In the first stage, the exogenous 
variables include all the explanatory variables in Table 2 and two additional instruments, namely, 
benefit payments and administrative expenses with a one-year lag. The overall goodness-of-fit is 
shown by an F-value of 24, which removes the concerns about the weakness of the instruments 
(Staiger and Stock 1997). The results on the first stage estimation are reported in the appendix. 
All the results shown in Table 2 are based on the random-effects estimation.  The choice 
of the random- over fixed-effects model is based upon the results of the Hausman test which 
favors the random-effects model.   
Our findings are largely consistent across four models.  The results suggest a significantly 
positive relationship between TANF recipients and poverty rate. A decrease of 1 percent in 
TANF recipients leads to a decline in the poverty rate of 0.37 to 0.51 percent.  This positive 
relationship between TANF and poverty is robust across the methods of estimation, i.e., with or 
without the use of instrumental variables. We therefore accept H1, that βTANFR > 0.  
Another interesting finding is about the impact of the welfare reform.  Across all models,   - 4 - 
the coefficient of REFORM is negative but statistically insignificant.  Thus the results reject H2 
as we do not find strong evidence that, during the period 1997-2003, the implementation of 
PRWORA has contributed to poverty reduction.  
Turning to other explanatory variables in the model, a higher unemployment rate results 
in higher poverty, and in general, southern states have higher poverty rates.  Compared to the 
northeast, the south has a median poverty rate about 3.2 percentage points higher. Finally, 
accounting for endogeneity is not found to change these results. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Our study investigates the relationship between US poverty and the implementation of 
PRWORA.  Based on our results from the random effects two-stage estimation, the higher rates 
of unemployment and TANF recipients lead to higher poverty, whereas the ongoing welfare 
reform post-1996 has not made a significant impact on the US poverty rate. 
We close our discussion with a note on further research. In this paper, we have taken 
poverty rate for the total population in each state as our dependent variable. But welfare reform 
might have had a greater impact on sub-population groups such as those with a female head of 
household, or on children. As Haskins (2001) and Zedlewski et al. (2002) note, the poorest 
quintile of families headed by single mothers had gained a small ground in the first half of the 
1990s but suffered an absolute decline in income in the second. While limited data availability 
made a rigorous econometric analysis of the effect on such groups impossible in the current 
study, we will explore how the welfare policy has affected sub-population groups, e.g., women 
and children, in a future research.   - 5 - 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics [N=464] 
Variables Descriptions  Mean  Std. 
Dev  Min. Max 
POVR
1  Poverty rate (%), calculated as the ratio of the number of 
people living in poverty to population, by state 
12.39 3.90 5.20 26.40 
TANFR
2  TANF recipient rate (%), calculated as the ratio of total 
TANF recipients to population, by state 
2.82 1.85 0.15  12.21 
UNEMPR
1, 3  Unemployment rate  5.03 1.40 2.26  10.44 
DROPOUT
4  Public high school dropouts by state  4.92 1.99 1.80  13.70 
WEST  Regional dummy variable, =1 if the state is located in the 
west; else 0 
0.18 0.38  0  1 
SOUTH  Regional dummy variable, =1 if the state is located in the 
south; else 0 
0.23 0.42  0  1 
MIDWEST  Regional dummy variable, =1 if the state is located in the 
midwest; else 0 
0.24 0.43  0  1 
PRWORA  Dummy variable for the implementation of PRWORA 1996, 
equals 1 for 1997 and after; and 0 for prior years 
0.56 0.50  0  1 
LADMIN
2  Administrative costs by states ($millions), in logarithm, 1 
year lag 
2.06 1.37  -4.39  5.79 
LBENEFIT
2  Total TANF benefits by states, in logarithm, 1 year lag.  4.67 1.19 0.69 7.95 
 
Sources of Data:   
 
1. US Census Bureau.   
2. US Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Program 
Support, Office of Management Services.  
3. US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
4. US Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data.   - 7 - 
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2.314 2.291  2.992  2.942 
σ-var 
1.577 1.580  1.609  1.621 
χ
2  207.58 207.44  198.22  F:  19.61 
R
2  0.44 0.44  0.42  0.43 
 
Notes:  
1. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors, adjusted by heteroscedacity-robust covariance.  
2. *, **, *** indicate significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.   - 8 - 




Random Effects, Panel with 
endogeneity correction 
Intercept  -2.613*** 
(0.741) 
UNEMPR
  0.424*** 
(0.046) 
DROPOUT
  0.116 
(0.040) 
WEST  -0.869 
(0.564) 
SOUTH  -0.800 
(0.541) 
MIDWEST  -0.213 
(0.544) 
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